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DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURES AND URBAN GOVERNANCE 
 
The urban built environment is underpinned by an increasingly complex digital 
infrastructure, which is posing a variety of unpredictable and unprecedented 
challenges for urban governance. The paper outlines the key strands of digital 
infrastructures which underpin the urban polity, including the role of global 
technology providers in shaping the urban governance agenda around digital policy; 
and the emergence of smart city strategies. The paper is illustrated using empirical 
examples drawn from Australian digital infrastructure development, with reference 
to the international landscape of ‘smart city’ developments. It argues that there is a 
significant mismatch between the often small scale, bounded capabilities of municipal 
government, and the actively large-scale operations of technology firms.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
The digital foundations of the modern city are becoming an increasingly visible part 
of everyday urban life. Urban infrastructure is being ‘instrumented’ by sensor 
technologies, allowing information processing to be diffused into the material spaces 
of cities. There is growing recognition that ‘public sector information’ (PSI) and 
public urban data represents an increasingly strategic, and potentially monetisable, 
asset.  A recent OECD paper estimated a value of PSI data at EUR 32 billion for the 
European market alone (OECD 2014: 4), resulting from new organisational and 
management approaches or significantly improving existing practices. Such benefits 
can be obtained from weather forecasts, traffic management, crime statistics, 
improved transparency of government functions (e.g. procurement) and educational 
and cultural knowledge for the wider population (OECD 2014). More recently, 
growing attention towards the use of IoT ('internet of things) has also highlighted 
opportunities for smart infrastructure services in cities, driven by distributed sensors 
delivering real-time performance data and allowing improved monitoring of urban 
systems.    
 
This paper examines a set of governance challenges associated with recent digital 
infrastructure investments and strategies, reflecting a broader shift away from 
vertical, often government-controlled integration, to environments involving a mix 
of multiple public, private and quasi-private entities that manage and govern urban 
infrastructural systems (Alizadeh, Sipe and Dodson 2014). Accompanying these 
shifts, the governance of digital infrastructures is extending from a narrow focus on 
the technical infrastructure of pipes and cables that deliver digital communications to 
Australian cities and regions, to include concerns around the management, use, 
access and distribution of data to support decision making by city authorities under 
the rubric of 'smart city' policies.  
 
The paper addresses two recent approaches to Australian public investments in 
digital infrastructure. The first relates to the Federal Government investment in 
national broadband infrastructure, in which digital infrastructure was framed more 
conventionally as an engineering problem, its assets promoted as a means to 
supporting knowledge-based economic development goals across Australian cities 
and regions. This approach saw public investment in digital infrastructure justified as 
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a means to attracting global capital and build digital economy capabilities, thus 
confirming a more traditional 'urban entrepreneurial' approach—whether at national, 
regional or urban scale. The second, more recent approach has shifted the focus away 
from the physical dimensions of broadband technology as an enabling infrastructure 
of the digital economy, towards emphasis on the role of government as enabler and 
facilitator of data-driven services.  
 
The political economy of digital infrastructure 
 
At times, Australian public discourse on digital infrastructures is reduced to the 
efficiency and cost effectiveness of various engineering and procurement processes: 
how best to deliver networks of cable, fibre and telecommunications masts; 
datacenters; and front end devices, apparently neutral assets that can be manipulated 
and designed to achieve desired strategic outcomes (Beckert 1999; Child 1997; 
Broadbent and Weill 1997). Another view of digital infrastructure is grounded in 
systems and complexity theory, which argues that to understand digital 
infrastructure requires understanding the relationship between the technological and 
social elements of such systems (Tilson et al. 2010a; Vaast and Walsham 2009). In 
digital infrastructure terms these social elements include the changing industry, 
regulatory, and market structures as well as the wide ranging effects on citizens’ 
lives, work, and interactions that have been rapidly advanced the most recent wave of 
digitization .As Tilson et al. describe “a rapid divergence is emerging in how service 
creation, distribution, and use occurs, which, paradoxically, is built upon the 
convergence around the bit” (Tilson et al, 2010b). 
 
A powerful critique of how infrastructure is currently developed globally has 
emerged, however. The ‘splintering urbanism’ approach advanced by Graham and 
Marvin (2001) has been particularly influential here. It charted a worldwide 
unbundling of infrastructure networks, particularly around the privatization and split 
ownership of information and communication technologies, driven largely by a neo-
liberal agenda of less state involvement in asset ownership and management. As the 
smart cities agenda has developed, this has been given a clear profile in terms of 
public policy. Under post-industrial ‘new economy’ growth frameworks, the 
economic competitiveness of cities has been largely understood through the lens of 
'urban entrepreneurialism’ (Harvey, 1989). In this context, attempts to understand 
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the significance of the 'digital city' have involved the hybridization of urban policy 
between incentivizing the location and retention of technology firms and employees, 
on the one hand, and delivering digitized, and hence ‘smart’, public services (see for 
example Hollands 2008; Blakely & Bradshaw, 2002; Alizadeh, Sipe and Dodson 2014; 
Wiig 2015). This has led to a blurring of the role of public and private actors in 
policy formation and service delivery, as well as creating a new set of policy 
challenges that public discourse has little grasp on. As Rob Kitchin has argued: 
 
“Smart city advocates imagine themselves as creating technologies, 
techniques and visions that are scientific, objective, commonsensical and 
apolitical. In general, there is little critical reflection on the wider 
implications of technologically rooted entrepreneurial urban development, or 
the consequences of networked urbanism, for city administrations and 
citizens. Left untouched are issues such as panoptic surveillance, technocratic 
and corporate forms of governance, technological lock-ins, profiling and 
social sorting, anticipatory governance, control creep, the hollowing out of 
state provided services, widening inequalities and dispossession of land and 
livelihoods (especially on green field sites).” (p.2). 
 
 
Building digital infrastructure for Australian cities 
 
In Australia in recent years, digital infrastructure investment has been given a 
prominent role. From 2009 until 2013, digital infrastructure investment was 
explicitly championed by Government as a core 'nation building' exercise and 
fundamental to Australia's future growth. This began with the announcement in 
April 2009 by the Federal Labour Government of a $44 billion National Broadband 
Network initiative (NBN). The intention of the NBN was to deliver terrestrial fibre 
network coverage for 93 per cent of Australian premises by the end of 2020, with the 
remaining 7 per cent served by fixed wireless and satellite coverage (NBN Co. Ltd., 
2010). Had it progressed in its planned form, the NBN would have represented the 
largest single infrastructure project undertaken in Australia's history (see Alizadeh, 
Sipe and Dodson 2014).    
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Following announcement of the NBN, the Federal Government supported a range of 
initiatives to promote access to and use of broadband infrastructure by Australian 
communities. In May 2011 it released the #au20 National Digital Economy Strategy, 
with an aim that by 2020, Australia will be among the world’s leading digital 
economies. This was accompanied by a set of key ‘Digital Economy Goals’ that 
focused on the following areas: improving online participation by Australian 
households; promoting online engagement by Australian businesses and not-for-
profit organisations; smart management of environment and infrastructure; improved 
health and aged care; expanded online education; increased teleworking; improved 
online government service delivery and engagement; and greater digital engagement 
in Regional Australia (see DBDCE 2011).  
 
Federal Government investment in next-generation broadband infrastructure was 
also accompanied by a significant number of programs to enable communities based 
outside metropolitan centres to maximise the benefits of this digital infrastructure 
investment. The creation of the $1.4 bn Regional Development Australia (RDA) fund 
in 2011 saw investment in a raft of digital economy strategies that outlined how 
NBN infrastructure could be used to support local economic development goals and 
priorities, largely by increasing the use of digital services by local businesses and 
organisations. As one such strategy outlined: "The advent of the National Broadband 
Network (NBN) and the potential of other digital technologies present new 
opportunities for economic, social and environmental development in the region" 
(RDA Peel, 2012). The RDA Northern Rivers Digital Economy Strategy for Businesses 
also focused on "how high-speed broadband can contribute towards growth of 
existing private sector businesses, together with opportunities for ‘new’ technology 
firms to establish themselves in the region" (2013). 
 
The table below outlines a set of examples of RDA-sponsored digital strategies 
commissioned between 2011 and 2013 and the key priorities of each.  
 
RDA   Digital Strategy, year Priority areas 
Geelong, Victoria G21 Digital Strategy (2012) 
http://www.ictgeelong.com.au/ind
ex.php/key-activity/g21-digital-
strategy 
Increase business uptake of digital 
solutions that enhance productivity and 
profit. 
Improve G21 region’s connectivity for 
residents, students, travellers and 
business people on the move throughout 
the city. 
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Build the capacity of G21 region’s digital 
industries. 
Promote G21 region’s wealth of digital 
capability. 
 
Hume Victoria Digital Hume: A digital strategy for 
a smart region (2013) 
 
See: 
http://www.rdv.vic.gov.au/regional-
development-australia/hume/ict/ict-
strategy-development 
 Maximising the impact of the NBN 
 Striving to get all online by 2017 
 Working towards transforming of 
public services 
 Encouraging digital enabled businesses 
 Marketing Digital Hume 
 
RDA Murraylands, 
Victoria 
The Digital World: An opportunity 
to connect (2012) 
 
http://www.rdamr.org.au/fileadmin/ 
user_upload/Riverland/documents/R
DAMR_ 
Digital_Strategy_Document_2014_
Final.pdf 
 
 
 
Encourage and promote investment 
attraction and the diversification of 
Industry within the region in an 
endeavour for Economic Growth, 
Population Growth and the building of 
capacity and capability within the 
community. 
 
Peel RDA, 
Western Australia 
Building the Peel's digital future 
(2012) 
 
http://www.rdapeel.org.au/wp-
content/uploads/2015/05/Peel-
Digital-Futures-Strategy-FINAL.pdf 
The diverse economic base, enabled by 
technology, will support an improved 
level of employment sustainability and a 
greater range of employment 
occupations. Professionals, freelancers 
and members of the “creative class” will 
be attracted to work and live in the 
region, supported by good access to 
digital technologies and services. 
 
RDA Northern 
Inland 
RDANI Digital Economy Strategy 
(2013) 
 
http://www.rdani.org.au/projects/dig
ital-economy-strategy.php 
Focuses on how high-speed broadband 
can contribute towards growth of existing 
private sector businesses, together with 
opportunities for ‘new’ technology firms 
to establish themselves in the region. 
 
Northern Rivers 
RDA, NSW 
Northern Rivers Digital Economy 
Strategy (2013) 
 
http://rdanorthernrivers.org.au/down
load/industry_and_economic_devel
opment/digital-
economy/NR%20Digital%20Econo
my%20Strategy%20WEB.pdf 
To improve lives, businesses and 
communities in the Northern Rivers the 
strategy focuses on: 
-harnessing digital technologies today to 
provide better education, enhance digital 
literacy, increase access to Government 
services, and improve the health of the 
community;  
-optimising the use of digital 
technologies to build more profitable 
businesses and ensure their long term 
future, while respecting and maintaining 
the quality of our natural environment; 
and  
-using digital technology to allow 
improved collaboration between diverse 
communities to maintain and enhance the 
unique fabric of the region.  
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Mid North Coast 
RDA, NSW 
Making the Connections, Filling the 
Gaps (2011) 
 
http://www.rdamnc.org.au/wp-
content/uploads/mid-north-coast-
digital-stategy-final-lr.pdf 
The Mid North Coast region has a game-
changing opportunity • to raise GDP • 
change market perceptions of the area • 
transform public services • up-skill and 
strengthen local communities; and • 
reinforce an emerging digital economy 
 
 
 
Under the federal Digital Economy Strategy released in 2011 by the former 
Department of Broadband, Communications, and Digital Economy (DBCDE), 
greater investment was advocated to support local businesses in maximising the 
economic benefits of digital infrastructure investment for Australian communities 
(DBDCE 2011: 34). A Government Business Enterprise (GBE), NBN Co Limited, 
was established to manage the roll-out of the infrastructure, with a view to building 
over the long-term a more competitive structure for Australian telecommunications. 
In particular, the model of NBN Co facilitated 'structural separation' between the 
'backbone network' of wholesale service provision, and retail services delivered by 
internet service providers (ISPs) to customers. This structural separation was a long 
term goal of Australian telecommunications policy, designed to address competition 
issues surrounding the former government-owned telecommunications provider 
Telstra, whose dominant position in the marketplace had been the subject of frequent 
reviews and hearings by Australia's competition watchdog (see Nicholls, 2014).   
 
According to Alizadeh, Sipe and Dodson (2014), the NBN investment represented a 
major advance in the quality of information technology infrastructure in Australia. 
Rather than a patchwork of private, globalised and networked infrastructure 
providers, here was a ubiquitous, vertically and horizontally integrated and 
organized, national megaproject. However, following the 2013 election of a new 
Coalition Government, Federal Government policy on the NBN was significantly 
revised, based on the argument by incoming Coalition Government that the former 
Labour Government had poorly managed the set up and operation of the NBN Co. 
The outcome of the new policy has indeed resulted in a patchwork of different 
commercial providers and scaling back of direct government investment—more akin 
to the ‘splintering’ model of contemporary infrastructure investments.  
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Under the Coalition policy, investment was scaled back from $44bn to $29.5 bn (this 
has now risen back to $46-56 bn), and the design of the network refocused around 
'fibre to the node' (FTTN) rather than 'fibre to the premises' (FTTP). An 
independent review of NBN Co also found that NBN Co lacked "deep internal 
experience in complex infrastructure, construction projects and project management" 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2013: 13). The redesign of the network around FTTN 
represented a significant reduction in network capability, with the Coalition 
Government's FTTN design involving a 'multi-technology mix' (MTM) that was 
more reliant on an existing legacy copper wire network rather than a new fibre-optic 
network. As technology commentator Paul Budde commented, this saw Australia 
increase investment in its existing copper cables just as the rest of the world began to 
move away from copper to fibre (Budde 2016).  
 
In December 2014, the Federal Government announced that that NBN Co would 
meet its roll-out schedule partly by acquiring existing HFC cable infrastructure 
owned by telecommunications providers Telstra and Optus-SingTel; the deal with 
Telstra was at a cost of $11 bn (see Telstra 2014). In April 2016 Telstra was also 
awarded a $1.bn contract to manage the design, construction management and 
upgrades to the HFC cable that had been previously sold to the NBN Co in 2014. 
This deal has raised concerns from Australia's competition regulator about Telstra's 
competitive advantage in the provision of digital infrastructure to Australian homes 
(ABC News, 2016).  
 
New telecommunications policy at the Federal level, promoting an MTM model in 
the provision of NBN infrastructure, has impacted the implementation of those local 
digital strategies previously funded to maximise the benefits of next-generation 
broadband. Under Coalition policy between 2013 and 2015, the narrative around the 
NBN shifted away from that of an enabling infrastructure facilitating 'nation 
building', to one requiring what Peck, Theodore and Brenner (2012: 269) have 
described as "market-disciplinary regulatory restructuring". NBN Co, a creation of 
the former Labor Government, was framed by the Coalition as inexperienced in 
infrastructure management, with a succession of former CEOs of international 
telecommunications providers installed to 'fix' the organisation (see Commonwealth 
of Australia 2015). No additional funding has since been administered through RDA 
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for further digital economy strategies to promote ‘take-up’ of NBN broadband 
infrastructure.  
 
The different policy positions adopted by successive Australian Governments do help 
underscore just how bound up infrastructure investment programs can be to the 
normative aspirations of their funders (Graham and Marvin 2001). Under Labor, the 
NBN was a focal feature of the Australian Government’s policy platform and was 
accompanied by high expectations about its ability to resolve multiple policy 
challenges relating to economic productivity and social connectedness (Alizadeh, Sipe 
and Dodson 2014). For the Coalition Government, the NBN was positioned as a 
victim of poor management, requiring the corrective of effective economic 
management to ensure cost-reductions for consumers and more efficient 
organisational business practices.  
 
From enabling to instrumenting: the rise of the smart city 
 
Globally, the development of ‘smart city’ policies has seen another shift in the 
framing of digital infrastructure. Within smart cities, public investment in digital 
infrastructure is seen as central platform for evaluating the performance and 
management of cities and governments (see for example Arup 2014). This shift 
suggests greater attention is needed to address governance implications of digital 
infrastructure in an age of smart cities.  As Luque-Ayala and Marvin (2015: 8) have 
argued: 
 
“An emerging set of detailed conceptual work is needed to illustrate how 
smart technologies – data analysis, software systems, networked 
infrastructure and new digital systems such as sophisticated control and 
pricing technologies – are used to more intensively unbundle and 
rebundle users, space, services and networks. Further conceptual and 
empirical work is needed to examine what political rationalities are 
embedded within such responses, and which stakeholders are excluded 
from the future ‘smart city’.” 
 
The past five years have seen widespread uptake of smart city strategies by cities 
around the world, provoking greater attention towards the governance opportunities 
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associated with cities that are ‘run on information’. This has been manifest not only 
in the operational activities of city governments but also in a shift in the fundamental 
role and purpose of city governance in the information age. Notably, specialist 
consultants are driving forward this agenda. As the engineering and planning firm 
Arup argued in a 2010 white paper, “the smart city is so different in essence to the 
20th century city that the governance models and organisational frameworks 
themselves must evolve” (Arup 2010).  Arup has been upbeat about the potential for 
governance improvements resulting from smart city-led instrumentation, which, it 
argues “allow us to rewire governments by design, transforming the way they work 
internally and together with outside partners and citizens” (p.32).  Indeed one of the 
identified benefits of smart city technologies is the ‘reinvention of governance’ (Arup 
2014).  
 
Leveraging advances in data development, aggregation and engagement, many 
governments are deploying the ‘city wide digital strategy’ as a governance 
intervention to ensure their jurisdictions properly capitalise on the opportunities 
around data-driven governance (Barns 2016). These strategies can be seen as distinct 
from previous generations of digital economy strategy or ‘digital era governance’ 
(Dunleavy 2013), in that they are more focused on implementing data-driven decision 
making tools as integral to the performance of governing itself—not just to the role 
of government in supporting or enabling particular industry sectors. In cities such as 
New York, data-driven analytics tools and platforms are used to improve internal 
efficiencies and deliver better services to citizens (NYC 2011). More widely, open 
data platforms are prioritized by city governments as strategic engagement tools to 
allow government data to be released in machine-readable formats, adopted by 
entrepreneurs and software developers to deliver new services and platforms to 
citizens.  
 
Through these emergent policy models, we are seeing the conditions of access to and 
use of public service information (PSI), along with the particular framing of data-
driven discovery methods, becoming increasingly integral to questions of policy 
formulation and everyday urban governance. Though governments are generally 
considered to be the custodians of public service information, they don’t always 
possess the governance capabilities to design and implement new systems and 
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processes for integrated, large-scale data harvesting and processing implied by urban 
big data. 
 
In the global context, we are seeing a new set of private actors and capabilities 
becoming increasingly embedded within urban policy and governance settings. 
These firms are often scaled globally, which contrasts sharply with the localized 
nature of urban government. These actors include the ‘supplier’ side of traditional 
physical infrastructure components, which tend to be large private companies that 
are either contracted by government to implement networks of optical fibre, or who 
invest themselves in these networks in order to capture market share. For example in 
the UK British Telecom (BT) have a universal service obligation to provide telecoms 
infrastructure, but private companies like Virgin Media have opted to invest in their 
own FTTH services rather than using BT’s infrastructure.  
Some cities have set up their own public companies to provide physical 
infrastructure. For example in 1994 Stockholm City Council created ‘Stokab’ which 
they still own (http://stokab.se). The goal of the company has been to “build a 
competition-neutral infrastructure capable of meeting future communication needs, 
spur economic activity, diversity and freedom of choice, as well as minimising 
disruption to the city’s streets.” (www.Stokab.se/In-English). Other cities also own 
their own cable networks and use these assets for local development, such as Bristol’s 
fibre network being used for development of the Temple Meads Business district.  
 
Building on top of these services many large global tech companies such as IBM, 
Cisco, Siemens, Oracle (etc.) have been selling the concept of “city operating 
systems”, whereby city services are managed and controlled through centralised 
software located and operations centres in the city (Marvin et al 2015, Luque and 
Marvin 2015, McNeill 2015). Although this concept has been met with much 
criticism (such as Vanolo 2014) these operations centres have been rolled out in some 
cities, perhaps most famously in Rio de Janeiro. 
 
Given the rapid changes in technological platforms in recent years, we can also 
identify a diverse set of actors that build upon the foundational digital infrastructure 
in cites for a variety of purposes that are in some cases severely disrupting the 
operations, markets and experience of cities. We see global corporations such as Uber 
and Airbnb able to scale rapidly based on new digitally-enabled service models that 
 12 
require vastly reduced investment in capital assets as compared with their 
competitors. Smaller tech companies and start-ups are also capitalising on digital 
infrastructure systems to create new services for citizens. These include the 
innovations in transport services such as CityMapper, which was set up after London 
created its open data platform called the ‘London Datastore’. Companies with more 
social intentions such as Ushahidi1 who crowdsource citizen information during 
extreme events and MySociety2 who have created a variety of services to support 
engagement between citizens and government are changing the urban experience by 
empowering citizen voices through technology.  
 
In order to escape the binary city-individual limits and the ‘deterritorialised’ trap of 
the smart city, it is useful to follow on Keil and Mahon’s (2009) effort to start from a 
critical sense of scale, thinking digital infrastructure in the richness of its complex 
spatial inter-relationships. In fact, the development of networked urban 
infrastructures can itself retrofit the very boundaries of ‘scale’ and scalar perceptions, 
as digital innovations tinker with the “focal setting at which spatial boundaries are 
defined” (Agnew 1997: 100). The challenge of studying the politics of digital 
infrastructure, then, is also one of understanding the variety of, and contrasts 
between, urban imaginaries at play at the very same time by a diverse set of private 
sector led actors (Gibbs et al. 2013).  
 
 
Governance implications for cities 
 
Challenge 1: Data driven urban governance and strategy 
 
“Open data, or the release of data in re-usable and machine-readable formats, 
has become an increasingly vibrant field for data scientists and entrepreneurs 
who see opportunities to combine public or government data with other 
geographical information as a means to deliver new data-driven services and 
platforms. Where it originally advanced in close alignment with the “open 
government” movement on one hand, in promoting greater citizen 
engagement and transparency of public institutions, and the open source 
                                                 
1 Ushaidi’s http://www.ushahidi.com/  
2 https://www.mysociety.org/  
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software movement on the other, the recent proliferation of open data 
platforms can in one sense disrupt the notion that smart city policies are 
necessarily “vendor-driven”—that is, designed to reflect the business 
strategies of particular rent-seeking firms. Put bluntly, if smart city policies 
are simply reflections of decisions around which vendor-backed software to 
buy, why are so many cities adopting open standards as part of their smart 
city policies?” (Barns 2016 p.555). 
 
At first sight, the promises of the real-time city, where use of real-time data reveals 
in more fine-grained detail the complex systems of interlocking and multi-scalar 
networks of transportation, logistics, e-commerce transactions and the like which 
together make up the general urban condition, are premised largely on a relatively 
simplistic causal relationship between access to data and better urban decision 
making. But in reality not only is access to integrated real-time data sets anything 
but simple, for many governments, administrative boundaries for intervention do not 
map neatly over the territories to which accessible data-holdings may apply.   
 
Furthermore, the relative limiting of the governance capabilities of successive local 
and State-based agencies through privatization agendas (Gleeson et al 2004, Dodson 
2009), has left many local governments with a more limited capacity to access and 
make use of large quantities of urban data, now held by private utilities.  Major 
Australian cities are constituted by a patchwork of local government areas (LGAs) 
overlaid with State and Federal jurisdictions responsible for areas such transport, 
education, and health. The exception here is Brisbane City Council, the largest local 
government administration in Australia. Its scale has meant that Brisbane City has 
also taken on a major transport infrastructure planning role, which in some aspects 
rivals that of the State (Dodson 2009, p.117).  By contrast, the Sydney metropolitan 
region, for example, is comprised of 41 LGAs and 6 regional areas. The NSW 
Government, with responsibilities for both public transport and land use planning, 
has introduced successive Metro Strategies, recognized as relatively weak 
governance instruments comparative to State-based planning and infrastructure 
programs. No single agency has an integrated spatial authority over separate urban 
infrastructures and patterns of urban mobility, the basis from which many integrated 
real-time views of the city might be made possible.   
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Australian Governments at Federal, State and local levels are implementing a range 
of digital transformation initiatives directed at improving business and operational 
processes through use of data-driven tools.  These initiatives range in their scale and 
impact. At the Federal level, a newly created ‘Digital Transformation Office’ (DTO) 
leads digital transformation across Federal agencies through initiatives such as 
dashboards and data-driven, customer-centric apps and platforms. While successive 
Australian Governments have actively pursued a range of digital economy strategies 
and programs, the creation of the DTO is the first major attempt to systematically 
introduce data-driven transformation across agencies.  
 
At the State government level, governments are adopting agent-based data models 
are used to promote more integrated approaches to land-use planning and 
infrastructure investment (see SMART, 2012). The majority of State Governments 
are trialing the ‘government as platform’ model, releasing Open Data in machine-
readable formats for improved services provision via platforms such as data.gov.au 
and related sites.  
 
As Dodson (2009) has argued, over the past decade an ‘infrastructure turn’ across 
Australian cities has resulted in a concomitant shift in focus away from strategic 
spatial planning.  Along with a weakening of the influence of planning agencies in 
shaping metropolitan policy, has been growth in the influence of infrastructure 
departments and ad hoc engineering project ‘investigations’ (Dodson 2009, 112). The 
relative weakness of strategic spatial planning practices can be seen to act as a 
deterrent to any one agency or level of government adopting the scale of smart city 
strategy or policy evident elsewhere in the landscape of smart city international 
development. Consequently, the application of data analytics is often confined to 
single agencies such as transport infrastructure departments, without coherent or 
real-time application across different infrastructure and land use programs. In NSW, 
this lack of metro-scale governance has been the subject of increasing criticism from 
business groups such as the Committee for Sydney, which argues that many of 
Sydney’s most urgent development challenges require not only a metro strategy but 
a metropolitan governing agency.  
 
The patchwork of governance that is a feature of Australian cities is far removed 
from the ‘control room’ model of the smart city that foregrounds the use of real-time 
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urban data as a means for integrated and sophisticated analyses of urban behavior 
and planning effective urban management outcomes (Alizadeh and Shearer 2015).  It 
is to this strategic scale of the metropolitan region that smart city approaches to 
integrated data analytics are primarily directed.  According to Bettencourt (2013: 1), 
“the primary role of big data in cities is to facilitate information flows and 
mechanisms of learning and coordination by heterogeneous individuals.” It may be 
that the global interest and pursuit of integrated data analytics may result in a re-
focusing of attention towards the importance of integrated spatial planning as a 
strategic practice – whereby the effectiveness of city-wide data analytics clearly 
depends on governance arrangements that promote effective management and 
coordination within urban regions and across jurisdictions.  
 
Challenge 2: corporate ‘capture’ and the marketing of the smart city 
 
For Australian cities, investment in strategic frameworks to support smart city-
initiatives has been slow relative to other advanced economies.  As one commentator 
put it, “Australian governments are in no hurry to become smart” (Hall 2014).  Of the 
major metropolitan cities, the City of Brisbane was the only government to have 
adopted a ‘whole of government’ digital strategy that includes smart city targets 
(Digital Brisbane 2012). However, a new Prime Minister whose personal fortunes 
have been closely tied to the technology sector has seen a shift in public support for 
smart city development, with rapid acceleration in smart city policy during the first 
months of 2016. In April 2016, the Federal Government announced its Smart Cities 
Plan, while a number of local government authorities, including Newcastle City 
Council and Parramatta City Council, are proceeding with smart city strategies and 
policies.  
 
In May 2015, IBM announced the selection of the City of Melbourne as a recipient of 
one of the latest awards in IBM’s Smarter Cities Challenge Grant awards, one of 
sixteen recipients from one hundred applicants. The Challenge, wrapped within 
IBM’s Corporate Service Corps, is a pro bono ‘philanthropical’ division of the 
corporation that dispatches IBM employees to projects submitted by cities around 
the world. As part of this process IBM employees spend three weeks living in each 
municipality, “giving them a real feel for the texture of local daily life.” The winning 
applicants are expected to show “that they are ready to match IBM's investment with 
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its own commitment of time and talent.” IBM defined the role of the visits as to 
“outline a range of concrete strategies designed to help make cities healthier, safer, 
smarter, more prosperous, and attractive to current and prospective residents and 
businesses.” (IBM 2012). The value of each grant is nominally ascribed as 
US$400,000. Every year since its launch, the company has engaged more than 20 
municipal governments, from Birmingham in the UK, to Cheongju in South Korea, 
and has worked on a range of city-specific urban policy issues, the lessons from which 
could be scaled globally.  
 
At first glance, the use of ‘philanthropic’ modes of engagement with local 
governments – who are usually receptive to these possibilities given chronically 
strained recurrent budgets – is a normative good. The projects are also strong 
‘headline’ initiatives that councils can publicise, promising significant observable 
changes in the ease and costs of everyday life things, from cheaper water provision to 
reducing congestion through intelligent traffic lights. However, the harder side of 
the relationship between city governments and the major technology corporations 
comes in the procurement of major IT and software platform contracts. These 
contractual relationships are often a complex and highly confidential process, and 
occasionally come unstuck.  
 
A key example in the Australian context is the Queensland Health Payroll System 
Commission of Inquiry (2013). In this case, the Queensland Government contracted 
with IBM to deliver a payroll system for its public sector health employees. The 
Inquiry revealed that IBM had been selected over its main competitor, Accenture, on 
the basis of price, but the system changeover had failed in a very high profile way, 
with many frontline staff not being paid on time. These procurement issues continue 
to be played out across Australian local and state governments. For reasons of both 
complexity and cost, it appears that many city governments have been reluctant to 
invest in the full set of smart city options that corporations are offering to them. 
Commenting on a deal between Adelaide City Council and Cisco, the city’s Chief 
Executive was quoted: "I would not want Adelaide to be at the bleeding edge of 
technology but I am keen to progress this. We are quite happy for a company like 
Cisco to come and work with us but I will reserve my judgment” (in Hall 2014). 
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Such caution seems to reflect a view that we are still in an experimental phase of 
smart city technology: major firms such as IBM are still to convincingly display a 
profit on their smart city products, and despite their high profile pilot projects, it is 
not clear that they will find it easy to standardize a common product or strategy on a 
global scale (McNeill 2015). Australia will be an interesting test of this, given its 
relatively small municipalities.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The politics of the digital city are structured around a highly differentiated 
governance landscape. As we have shown, privatization of major core urban assets, 
from energy to rail and telecommunications has also ensured data accessibility 
remains more limited.  In turn, this process has limited the scale and volume of data, 
related to contemporary urban flows (energy, telecommunications, and in some 
instances rail) that is actually accessible by public agencies for the purposes of 
integrated, spatially coordinated urban management. In many ways, this continues 
to follow the ‘splintering’ logic described by Graham and Marvin (2001) where 
premium network infrastructures are made available on a user pays model. On the 
other hand, the relative fluidity of datasets, which lacks the huge sunk costs of ‘hard’ 
infrastructure, makes this a far more elusive and complex object of governance. 
Making open data available brings its own political challenges, and as we noted 
above often hybridizes different policy elements: “Through the open data movement 
the conditions of good governance are also linked to the success of digital 
entrepreneurialism, the vibrancy of a local tech sector, and the successful integration 
of public data assets into proprietary software services.’ (Barns 2016 p.566). 
Moreover, it means that the elected bodies associated with governing cities must 
have skills in negotiating with a wide range of actors, from multinational firms like 
Uber, Cisco and IBM, national technology giants like Telstra, and a wide range of 
start-ups and SMEs responding to procurement opportunities.  
 
The question of public data, and how it is used, has also been an important field of 
inquiry, and one that continues to evolve. From a political economy perspective, it is 
important to move into a finer-grained analysis of how data is deployed, monetized, 
and stored than has often been the case. And so, as one of us has argued elsewhere,  
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“Where open data programs require the publication of highly localized data 
sources in machine-readable formats, and do so to facilitate new marketplaces 
for software entrepreneurship using public data assets, they become an 
important mechanism for the introduction of entrepreneurial governance by 
code. Perhaps more so than promoting government accountability and 
citizen-oriented engagement, this reconstitution of the role of government 
may be the greatest legacy of open data programs.” (Barns 2016, p.556). 
 
These challenges demand more extended considerations on the multi-level 
governance of the ‘smart city’. As we have discussed above, this calls for a view of 
digital infrastructure that integrates perspectives and scalar appreciations from 
different analytical angles. For example, starting from an international, rather than 
urban, angle, political scientists have depicted the politics of “large technical systems” 
underpinning much of the dynamics of “planetary urbanisation” (Brenner 2013; 
Mayer and Acuto 2015). To address this challenge, for instance, Herrera (2002) 
discusses the international ‘politics of bandwidth’ of internet provision in major 
urbanised areas as a “three-way political struggle between centralized political 
authorities (states), centralized economic entities (firms) and individuals as both 
consumers and citizens.” In this sense, a better appreciation of the multi-scalar 
governance of digital infrastructures in the city is but a first, and yet critical, step 
towards an even broader consideration of the impact of urbanizing digital 
infrastructures on a complex urban world. Certainly, we can expect the relationships 
between urban governance and emerging digital infrastructures to remain a complex, 
yet rapidly evolving territory for urban policy and research for some time to come.   
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